When Prime Minister Philip J. Pierre announced last week that he had advised the Governor General to dissolve Parliament for a general election, pursuant to Section 55(4) of the Constitution of Saint Lucia, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Tourism Ernest Hilaire subsequently issued Ministerial Statements, some political observers questioned the latter’s authority.
They argued that the minister lacked standing to make such statements, suggesting that government action now rests solely with the Governor General, as the executive has ceased to exist. Others challenged the legitimacy of the VAT-free holiday, the St. Jude Hospital ceremony and similar initiatives, claiming these were impermissible because Parliament had been dissolved.
This is a misconception. The purpose of this article is not to defend any individual, but to clarify the constitutional framework and the role of the Executive. While accountability is vital to good governance, it must not be undermined by misinterpretations that erode constitutional authority.
As my Constitutional and Public Law lecturers often remind students, the first port of call is always the Constitution – the supreme law of the land, and one that should be required reading for every citizen.
Dissolution of Parliament
What occurred last week was the dissolution of Parliament, which, under Section 40 of the Constitution, is “responsible for the passing of laws for the peace, order and good governance of Saint Lucia”.
Section 55(4) provides that the Governor General must act on the advice of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament. While the Constitution allows the Governor General to refuse dissolution in their own deliberate judgment if it is not in the best interest of Saint Lucia, this is exceedingly rare. In practice, and in keeping with Westminster conventions, the Governor General customarily follows the Prime Minister’s advice.
Parliament may also be dissolved naturally under Section 55(2), if it continues for five years from its first sitting (which must occur within one month of the general election result, per Section 54). This is subject to emergency exigencies under subsection (3), which are not relevant here.
The effect of dissolution is that the Legislature or Parliament ceases to exist. No new laws can be introduced or passed. Similar to prorogation, any bills under consideration are discarded and would have to be reintroduced in the next parliamentary session, in line with the convention that no Parliament can bind its successor.
If urgent business remained, the Prime Minister and Leader of Government Business could have brought it before Parliament or delayed dissolution. However, the timing of elections is often driven more by political strategy than legislative priorities.
With Parliament dissolved, MPs vacate their seats. There are no parliamentary representatives for any constituency during this interim period.
What Happens to the Executive?
Crucially, the Executive arm of government continues during this period under the “caretaker” convention. The Executive oversees the day-to-day running of government and sets policy direction. It does not grind to a halt when elections are called.
One might ask: if the Executive emerges from the Legislature, how can it persist when the Legislature no longer exists?
It’s akin to a trustee-settlor relationship: a trustee may be appointed by a settlor, but continues to administer the trust even after the settlor’s death.
Technically, the Executive cannot exist without the Legislature – ministers, including the Prime Minister, must first be Members of Parliament. Yet constitutional conventions and legal interpretation allow ministers to remain in office during this transitional period.
The first justification is practical: the machinery of government must continue. Our system is a fusion of powers, where the same individuals occupy both legislative and executive roles. But in law, these roles are distinct. When one terminates, the other does not. Ministers remain responsible for policy and administration, even if they are no longer sitting MPs.
Though the term “separation of powers” does not appear in Saint Lucia’s Constitution, the Westminster system is built on this principle. Each arm of government has defined powers and functions. While the Executive and Legislature interact and check each other, they do not encroach on each other’s domains, especially regarding judicial power.
This doctrine does not require strict separation, but rather a balance of power, functional differentiation, and mutual checks. It allows the Executive to emerge from the Legislature and overlap in personnel and functions, while preserving judicial independence as the rigid boundary.
Cases such as J. Astaphan v. Comptroller of Customs (1970) and Hinds v. R (1975) affirm that “it is taken for granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to the exercise of their respective functions by these three organs of government.”
Section 56 of the Constitution is also instructive. It provides for a maximum period of three months before the hosting of a general election.
But does this mean that, during that time, there is no executive authority in the country?
A common retort might be: “Ministers don’t do anything anyway; it’s the Permanent Secretary…”
If one wishes to debate the effectiveness of ministers during dissolution, or whether executive roles should persist in this period, that’s a separate conversation. This discussion is about the law as it is, not as it should be.
It does not account for every instance of political praxis. So, if the Minister of Tourism chooses to address the nation, one may question the relevance, motives, or rationale, but not the authority. He remains a Minister of Government, clothed with the same powers he held prior to dissolution, by virtue of the continuity of government.
To further buttress this point, Section 60(5) of the Constitution empowers the Prime Minister to appoint additional Ministers if necessary, even during this period, from among the Senators or Members of the House who served prior to dissolution. It’s as if they’ve vanished, yet remain available for deployment at the Prime Minister’s discretion.
Another consideration: the Constitution vests the power to appoint the Prime Minister and other Ministers in the Governor General, as per Section 59. One of the cardinal rules of Constitutional Law is: “Ye who appoints must disappoint.”
Since the Governor General has not “dis-appointed” any Minister of Government – per Section 60(9), which requires the Prime Minister’s advice – it stands to reason that they continue to hold office.
Moreover, Section 60(8) does not list dissolution of Parliament as a reason for a Minister’s position to become vacant. In fact, a strict textual reading shows that the office of Prime Minister or any other Minister becomes vacant only after the new Parliament convenes and the individual is no longer a member of the House, either through resignation or electoral defeat.
In effect, the Prime Minister and Ministers remain in office until the new Parliament begins. Any questioning of their powers during this period is therefore constitutionally unfounded.
Similarly, the view that the Governor General exercises executive authority during this time is incorrect. While Section 59 states that “executive authority is vested in Her (His) Majesty, and is exercised on behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor General either directly or through officers subordinate to him or her,” Westminster conventions make clear that, de facto, executive authority rests with the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The UK Cabinet Manual is instructive here. It notes: “While the government retains its responsibility to govern and ministers remain in charge of their departments, governments are expected by convention to observe discretion in initiating any new action of a continuing or long-term character in the period immediately preceding an election. This means the deferral of activity such as: taking or announcing major policy decisions; entering into large/contentious procurement contracts or significant long-term commitments; and making some senior public appointments and approving Senior Civil Service appointments, provided that such postponement would not be detrimental to the national interest or wasteful of public money. If decisions cannot wait, they may be handled by temporary arrangements or following relevant consultation with the Opposition.”
Though Saint Lucia does not have a similar manual, these guidelines are customary components of our parliamentary democracy.
It is my hope that this explanation has helped clarify the matter.
