Man Gunned Down Outside Arrivals at Piarco Airport

“Enhancing Security Measures in CARICOM States: Addressing Known Unknowns and Unknown Knowns”
Recent high-impact, low-probability security incidents, including the targeted killing at PIACO International Airport and the hijacking of a small domestic flight over Belize, have underscored the challenges faced by security agencies. Despite significant efforts, these agencies have struggled to maintain acceptable levels of security for the populations of CARICOM states. Are there other measures that may be considered that will prevent or reduce incidents such as these?
A heavy law enforcement presence, and in some cases, a militarized police presence is the often – automatic reaction. This measure does have some immediate value in creating a sense of public reassurance and security. Unless it is targeted at the perpetrators or designed to prevent further incidents, this reassurance is at best fallacious. Another pitfall is that the measure quickly loses public support as it is seen as an unnecessary discomfort and infringes on the rights of law-abiding citizens. It is often costly and of course unsustainable. More knowledge-based approaches initiated on the negative axes on the coordinate-plane and concluding with criminal prosecutions, if not deterred, are available to reassert the security of our people.
In presenting the approaches, I wish to recall the paradoxical theory of “known knowns” – things we know, “known unknowns” – things we know, that we do not know, and “unknown unknowns” – things we do not know, popularized by the two-time Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in 2002. This thinking has been suggested or used, in one way or another by the likes of the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates and later-on by the 19th Century German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. I do not wish to interest you beyond what is necessary to explain a variation of Honorable Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns”. Accordingly, “Known unknows are gaps in our knowledge, but they are gaps that we know exist”. The things we know that we do not know.
Without denigrating the scholarship of others, I wish to communicate my own variation – “unknown knows”, as previously presented by other intelligence and security professionals. This variation acknowledges that there are gaps in what we know and goes beyond this to show that a person or people in our communities have that knowledge.
The agencies responsible for security and the maintenance of law and order may not or do not know, or at best, what is known is incomplete. Also, we cannot ignore the general failure of imagination of the possibility that these kinds of incidents may occur. However, there are the few or many in our communities who know. Therefore, how do we convert the “unknown knowns” to “known knowns”? Solutions that involve the unsuspecting acquisition of the “knowns” from those in our communities who have the knowledge, seem to be academic. This would involve the pervasive exploitation of the privacy of our citizens. It is without choice that this must be done, as those who know, do not volunteer the information for one reason or another. The use of surveillance technologies coupled with human intelligence are practical solutions to convert the “unknown knowns” to “known knowns”. It is not to say that security agencies “legibility”, as characterized by Dr. Asfandyar Mir, is low. Security agencies do have a profound understanding of the dynamics of the crime phenomena presenting themselves in our various communities.
Agreeably, there are gaps in what is known, especially at the tactical level and therefore, alarmingly high-impact low-probability insecurity events will occur. Consequently, security agencies’ need to “F3EAD” their appetite for the “knowns” that will prevent or reduce the insecurity of our people.
The recent security incidents in CARICOM states have underscored the need for more effective and sustainable security measures. While a heavy law enforcement presence may provide temporary reassurance, it often infringes on citizens’ rights and lacks long-term viability. To address these challenges, it is crucial to leverage knowledge-based approaches that tap into the valuable information held by communities. By converting “unknown knows” to “known knows” through the use of surveillance technologies and human intelligence, security agencies can enhance their effectiveness and better prevent high-impact, low-probability events. Ultimately, a more informed and strategic approach to security will help ensure the safety and well-being of the populations in CARICOM states.